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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3085 
___________ 
 
MELANIA ISDIATI, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A099-940-363) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable R.K. Malloy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 10, 2013 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 13, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Petitioner Melania Isdiati petitions for review of an order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her motion to reopen.  For the reasons detailed 
below, we will deny the petition for review.   
 Isdiati is a citizen of Indonesia and a lifelong Catholic.  She entered the United 
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States on a visitor’s visa on March 14, 2004, overstayed, and was charged with being 
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for remaining in the United States for longer 
than permitted.  Isdiati applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under 
the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 
 In 2010, Isdiati appeared before an Immigration Judge (IJ).  She conceded 
removability and acknowledged that her asylum application was untimely.  However, she 
testified that she feared that she would be persecuted or tortured in Indonesia due to her 
Catholicism.  She stated that every Christmas, the church she attended in Tulungagung, 
East Java, would receive bomb threats from Islamic extremists.  Because of these threats, 
Isdiati testified, she did not attend holiday services and often felt unsafe at church.  Isdiati 
admitted that she had never been harmed in Indonesia due to her Catholicism, and that 
her sister Martina, who currently practices Catholicism in Indonesia, has likewise 
avoided harm. 
 The IJ denied all relief to Isdiati, finding that her asylum application was untimely 
and that she had failed to meet her respective burdens of proof for withholding of 
removal and CAT relief.  Isdiati then appealed to the BIA, which dismissed the appeal.  
The BIA agreed with the IJ that Isdiati’s asylum application was untimely.  Further, the 
BIA concluded that Isdiati had not established her eligibility for withholding of removal 
because, given that neither she nor her sister had ever been harmed, she had failed to 
demonstrate past persecution or that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution.  
Finally, the BIA ruled that Isdiati had failed to show that she was eligible for CAT relief.  
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We then denied Isdiati’s petition for review.  See Isdiati v. Att’y Gen., 474 F. App’x 882 
(3d Cir. 2012).   
 In April 2013, Isdiati filed the motion to reopen that is at issue here, alleging that 
the violence against Christians in Indonesia has increased.  The BIA denied the motion.  
The BIA explained that Isdiati’s evidence “shows a mixed picture — an increase in 
church closings but also development of an early warning system and encouragement of 
coexistence and tolerance of religious differences.”  Thus, the BIA concluded that Isdiati 
had shown that there were “continuing problems for Christians in Indonesia,” not 
“changed country conditions or changed circumstances there which are material” to her 
various claims.  Isdiati then filed a timely petition for review to this Court. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and review the BIA’s denial of 
Isdiati’s motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.  See Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 
404 (3d Cir. 2005).  Motions to reopen are “plainly disfavor[ed],” because “[t]here is a 
strong public interest in bringing litigation to a close as promptly as is consistent with the 
interest in giving the adversaries a fair opportunity to develop and present their respective 
cases.”  INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107, 110 (1988).  The BIA’s decision is thus entitled 
to “broad deference,” Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted), and it “will not be disturbed unless [it is] found to be arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law,” Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
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 Here, because Isdiati did not file her motion to reopen within 90 days of the final 
order of removal, she may proceed only if her motion relies on evidence of “changed 
country conditions.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  Such a motion must be based on 
“evidence [that] is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or 
presented at the previous proceeding.”  Id.  In determining whether country conditions 
have changed, the BIA compares current conditions to the conditions that existed at the 
time of the previous hearing before the IJ.  See Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 254 (3d 
Cir. 2006). 
 The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Isdiati’s motion.  As an initial 
matter, there is no merit to Isdiati’s claim that the BIA failed fully to consider the 
evidence that she proffered.  The BIA here expressly discussed the State Department’s 
2010 International Religious Freedom Report for Indonesia and the United States 
Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2011 Report for Indonesia.  While the 
BIA may not have explicitly commented on a report from the Human Rights Watch, as 
we have previously explained, “[c]onsideration of all evidence does not require comment 
on all evidence.”  Thu v. Att'y Gen., 510 F.3d 405, 416 n.16 (3d Cir. 2007).  Indeed, 
because the Human Rights Watch’s report is largely consistent with but less detailed than 
the reports the BIA did discuss, it was reasonable for the BIA to focus on the reports that 
it did.  See generally Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(holding that reliance on State Department reports is justifiable).  Accordingly, we are 
satisfied that the BIA properly considered Isdiati’s evidence.  
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 Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in denying Isdiati’s motion on the merits.  It 
was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that Isdiati’s evidence, rather than showing that 
conditions for Christians in Indonesia have deteriorated in a material way since the time 
of her initial hearing, shows only “continuing problems for Christians.”  As the BIA 
pointed out, while the State Department report notes an increasing number of church 
closings, it also suggests that in other ways, circumstances have improved — for 
instance, religious leaders and government officials have worked together to create an 
early-warning system to help anticipate and forestall possible conflict.  In fact, the 
evidence repeatedly describes the problems faced by Christians today as “continuing.”  
See, e.g., United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 
261 (2011) (“Based on these concerns, USCIRF continues to place Indonesia on its 
Watch List in 2011.  Indonesia has been on the Commission’s Watch List since 2002.”).  
Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Isdiati’s motion.  See Pllumi v. 
Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that the BIA did not err in denying 
reopening where evidence did “not indicate meaningfully changed country conditions,” 
but instead “suggest[ed] that the conditions described have persisted” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.  
 
